Kripke's famous account of Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox has been criticized for various reasons and is still a controversial matter in the literature. However. many commentators credit him with having established a bulwark against naturalist theories of meaning by pointing out their failure to capture the normative relation between the meaning and the use of a given expression. And indeed, the thesis that meaning is "fraught with 'ought' "2 – to use Sellars' memorable phrase – is still widely taken to be no more than a semantic platitude.³ Naturally, there have also been commentators who rejected and argued against the alleged platitude, and in recent years the thesis that meaning is normative has come under increased pressure.4 In my talk I want to defend the normativity of meaning against two interrelated arguments by showing that they are based on a flawed conception of semantic rules and thus pose no threat to the normativity thesis. My talk consists of two parts. In part I explore the background of the thesis that meaning is normative, point out possible ambiguities and specify the sense in which it is to be understood. I evaluate the first of the two arguments against the normativity thesis, which tries to show that the correctness conditions of an expression carry no implications for how to use that expression. In part II I assess the second argument against the normativity thesis, which tries to show that the two conditions the normativity thesis has to meet, namely constitutivity and prescriptivity, are incompatible with each other. In both parts I argue that the respective arguments fail and conclude that the normativity thesis can be maintained.

¹ Kripke (1982) has been attacked by numerous commentators, most prominently by Baker/Hacker (1984) and Boghossian (1989). For a recent and comprehensive assessment of the debate as well as a defense of Kripke cf. Kusch (2006).

² Sellars (1962: 44).

³ Cf. Wright (1980), Blackburn (1984), McDowell (1984), Brandom (1994), Glock (1996), Whiting (2009), Ginsborg (2011).

⁴ Cf. Bilgrami (1993), Glüer (1999), Wikforss (2001), Davidson (2005), Hattiangadi (2006 and 2009).